(1) their work did not support any major structural shifts in the corporate democrac)pvhich prevailed during that time (and, indeed, this time); (2) they supported an elitism, if yet not the traditional one; and/or (3) they supported centralist social control of the great bulk of Americans-in short, they supported a formal or informal, centralized oligarchy. Dewey was the nation's major liberal ph ilosopher during the period, and he probably had the greatest in· tellectual influence of any liberal thinker. He is a tempting target for revisionists.
What it would take to show that' Dewey really was a 2 proponent of the structural status quo would be one or more of a number of things. One of these would be to show that his theoretical philosophy openly advocated the structural status quo. Another would be to show that the philosophy was so inconsistent or ambiguous that it could be used to almost any purpose. Still another would be that Dewey consistently took positions on practical issues which supported the structural status quo, even if his theory apparently required that he would act other· wise. Now I think Dewey's theory is under attack on all three grounds; but, I further think that the revisionists are not aware that they s hould keep the attacks separate, for the attacks require different sorts of evidence and argu· ment.
It is easy (but probably wrong), for instance, to view a few specific practices of Dewey, conclude that his theory must necessarily justify such practices, anct then con· demn his theory. Or, it is easy (but wrong) to become im· patient with the scholarship necessary to fully grasp Dewey's socio-political philosophy, and "force" a ren· daring of it which leads to faulty interpretations of these practices.
Herein I concentrate particularly, but not exclusively, on what it is necessary for a revisionist to take into ac· count i f he is to succeed in showing that Dewey's social and political philosophy or theory supports or even lends itself to corporate, elitist centralism. I do not think the revisionist can succeed, but let us look at the case.
A Case in Revisionism
Why might a revis ionist think he could succeed? If the critic approaches Dewey's philosophy with the idea that a political theory is basic to Dewey's or anyone' s social philosophy, he might think so. Dewey's political philosophy, his theory of the forms of political power, will certainty appear wish}"'washy if that i s all one looks to. With few exceptions, Dewey rooted his political theory In a social theory of democracy. This Is evident, although the reasons for it are not yet fully clear, in his early and middle works. There is, for Instance, the classic passage in De· mocracy and Education, In which he gives us the t wo crite· ria which he says can be "extracted" from instances of community:
Now in any social group whatever .. . we find some interest in common, and we find a certain amount of Interaction and cooperative in· tercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our s tandard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are con· sciousty shared? How full and free is the In· terplay with other forms of association?' Many student newcomers-but not only they, ap· parently-to Dewey's thought sense a major problem here: they notice that the criteria do not specify majority rule, a canon of democratic political thought. Dewey him· self says that " ... democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated living."' And this makes it fair to ask if there cannot be modes of democratic community or associated living which do not abide by majority rule. There obviously could be for Dewey; e.g., the family with parents dominant, the extended community and neigh· borhood with elders dominant, occupational and profes· sional groupings with knowledgeable and skilled crafts· people dominant. These ordinarily are not examples of majority rule, but they can, if and w hen they are consistent with the criteria, be examples of democratic community. The c riteria simply are technically non-specific about po· litical forms.
If again, one is looking for political forms or power syst em s as basic, it equally can be noted that the political form o f representative government is not explic i tly sanc· tloned. Obviously the criteria demand participation and openness, but the f orm is left unspecified.
A third thing can mislead the unwary, and that Is Dewey's heavy emphasis upon inquiry, the method of in· telligence, and science. Not infrequently Dewey speaks of the mission o f science as being almost necessarily central to recons tructing a disintegrating American society. It is easy, and I think on a few occasions, warranted, to in· terpret him as meaning by "science" the body of scien· tists and/or the social institution of science. If one makes this leap, and it is a leap in the context of the corpus of his writing, it seems easy to conclude that Dewey is ad· vocating a scientific meritocracy.
There is another possible source for the view that Dewey " really" did not countenance more than a mod· lcum of participatory democracy. He sometimes speaks of the role of the citizen in a manner which seems curious ly unqualified t o the ardent democrat. Thus, he writes !hat:
The devotion of democracy to education is a fam iliar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage can not be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiat es the prin· c iple of external authority, It must find a s ub· s titute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. ' "laissez Fa ire Liberalism" These, I thi nk, are the major ploys which can be used to argue that Dewey's theory really is not democratic in any new sense, but s imply ano ther rendering of classic, laissez faire liberalism-this time with liberal intellectual s replacing, as the elite, the captains of industry and the o ther traditional socio ·political interest groups of corporate democracy.
These arguments do not in fact "connect" with Dewey's theory, however. Perhaps the most striking way of showing this is by giving hi s arg uments agains t making absolute such political devices as majority rule and representative government.
About the latter, Dewey maintains that it suggests or " contains about all that is relevant t o political democ· racy."• But he views this political notion as having arisen out of the push and pull of people seeking immediate re· dress of felt wrongs or needs, rather than some cosmic sense of justice. The ethical defense o f the notion lies ra· ther in its use, under proper c ircumstances, for obtaining the quality and fact of com munity. ' The argument which is relevant in the case o f rep· resentatlve government is most s uccinctly and c learly made by Dewey in the allied case of majority rule. It, like representative government, is one of the things he refers to as a political form of democracy, which was devised at a particular time in history to protect the values of com· munity. He refuses to make it anything more than that, an his torical provision, for fear that It, rather than what it is to protect, will become the important object. To do other·
Winter. 1980 wise would allow his philosophy to become a too l of what properly is called on occasion, "the tyranny of the majority." The more important thing i s what comes before and after a vote:
.. . antecedent debates, modificati ons of views to meet the opinions of minori ties, the relative satisfacti on given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that next time it may be successful in becoming a majority .
• In a word, what is more important than majori ty vote and majority rule i s commun ity before the fact of them and community afterwards! The emphasis upon, or de·emphasis of, majority rule and representative government as forms o f democracy, then, hardly suffices to question the centrality of the democratic notion in Dewey' s philosophy. ' What then of his emphasis upon science, the in· stitution and sc ientists? Do they represent a meritocratic class whic h merely is to substitu te for the businessmen· industrialists in a nonetheless centralized , corporate soci· ety? The question and its answers are so important to Dewey's social ph ilosophy that I shall not apologize for quoting at length. In his disc ussion of an ideal society, wh ich he referred to as the "Great Comm unity," he did not foresee corporateness or centralization whic h could (I.e., should) dictate life in decentralized communities. The Great Comm unity, he said, ... can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final work in ordering the relations and enri ching the ex· perience of local associations. The invasion and partial destruction of the life of the latter by outside uncontrolled agencies is the im · mediate source o f the instability, dislntegra· tion and restlessness which characterize the present epoch.' And, indeed, he traced part of the problem precisel y to ex · perts:
No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to thei r needs can be anything but an oligar· chy managed in the interests of the few .... The world has suffered more from leaders and !expert] authorities than from the masses.
• Or again:
Rule by an economic c lass may be d isguised from the masses; rule by experts coul d not be covered up. It could be made to work only if the intellectuals became the willing tools of big economic interests. Otherwise they would have to ally themselves with the masses, and that implies, once more, a share in government by the latter.
•• Or, still again: "A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a c lass with pri vate interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all."" Th is should put to rest the Idea that Dewey favored a centralized form of interventionist, governmental control. It s hould put to rest the idea o f corporate democracy. It should put to rest the idea of a meritocracy of experis or technocratic m eritocracy.
The fi nal part of this ploy, Dewey's occasional failure to qualify himsel f about the func tion of citizen deter· mination of rulers and " rules" is easy enough to dismiss as important in his total writings. Generally the qualification of necessary c itizen control is presenl if one will but pursue the discussion. In the instance c ited earlier, wherein Dewey speaks of those " who obey their gover· nors," one finds the qualification eventually forthcoming:
It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social control means subordination to c lass authority, there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the status quo.
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And, speaking of c itizenship, he says there is a required " ... abil ity to judge men and measures wisely and to take a determining part in making as well as obeying laws."
Even stronger statements can be found, although perhaps few in Democracy and Education. But, if we turn to his greatest work on social and polit ical philosophy, we read that, ... the current has set steadily in o ne direction : toward democratic forms. That government exists to serve its community, and that this cannot be achieved unless the community itself shares in selecting i!S governors and determining their policies is a deposit of fact left, as far as we can see, permanently in the wake of doctrines and forms, however transitory the latter. They are nol the whole of lhe democratic idea, but they express it in Its political phase .... We have every reason to think that whatever changes may take place in existing democratic machinery, they will be of a sort to make the interest of the public a more supreme guide and criterion of governmental activity, and to enable the public to form and manifest its purposes still more authoritatively." This discussion of the ploy of attacking Dewey's so· cial and polit ical theory of democracy should not con · elude without emphasizing the point of departure w hich makes it mainly possible. I take that to be an erroneous construal of the political aspect of Dewey's thought to primarily inform the social aspect. It works just the opposite for Dewey. The social concept of democracy is a necessary determinant of the political. Ullimately Dewey has his eye on the qualities of community associations i.vhich can meet the tvJo criteria \•1hich .were cited. Such qualities are not forms of democracy, they are the facts of democracy. As he says, Wherever there is conjoint activity whose con· sequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it In being just because it Is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. This c lear consciousness of a communal life, In all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. ' The political problem is to determine how, upon given occasions of difficulty, to effect this fact and consciousness. Finally, before shifting the analysis, one should recur to the notion of inqu iry or method of intelligence. A con-4 dition for democracy in his (and, one is sure, our) time was widely diffused abi lity to be critically intell igent. The public requires this to rule itself, to select, inform, and judge thOse who will represent it. This is a necessity of the age, heavily determ ined by science, technology, and technolog ical-industrial innovation. And, in this connection, one can say that it is a condition of the one form of democracy which does seem to be implicit In the social theory of democracy; viz., participatory democracy. To th is point we will return.
Discussion Relevant to Literature
As part of this paper, I want to criticize one particular analysis of Dewey's thought, partly to show that the above discussion is relevant to the current literature, and partly to show that one need not expect the three types of ploys to be so neatly isolated as my initial statement might unintentionally have suggested.
The particular analysis is found in Walter Feinberg's, Reason and Rhetoric. Dewey is treated as one, although perhaps the c entral, figure in arguing a revisionist case; and, it is solely upon hi s analysis of Dewey that I con· centrate. That I find this analysis very seriously flawed shou ld not be taken to indicate anything pro or con about his general thesis or his analysis of other so-called liberal thinkers. The general thesis does, however, set the context for the discussion cf Dewey.
The maj or oversight of progressive reform was a fail ure to lully understand the Implications of its recognition that every social structure is an embodiment of a set of values and that the Institutions in which these values are expressed have a strong influence on determining the desires and inclinations of the members of a society. Thus in §tead of a prolonged evaluation of the principles of social organization itself, the progressives insisted on evaluating in· stitutions merely on the basis of their lune· tional integration." One would expect to find that Dewey was excepted from this "the major oversight of progressive reform;" for if there is anything evident (in the earlier quotes, for exam'. pie) it is that Dewey did not make the mistake referred to by Feinberg. But Dewey is precisely the example chosen. Dewey, he writes, ... merely denied that the social interest was best served by the business establishment and proposed that institutions be altered so as to free technology from its control. His alternative was to change the position of the science and engineering establishments for that of [the) business establ ishment assuming perhaps that as the interest of science was served so too would be that of society. Yet like the laissez-faire theorist, no criteria other than functional ones were established to judge whether or not the social interest was being served.'' The criteria of democracy and the concept of idealized commu nity provide precisely the principles Feinberg says are lacking. Further, the whole notion of an eli tist m~ritocracy is, as we have seen, repugnant to Dewey. Still, Feinberg also could write:
Dewey was suggesting as d id Plato before him, that the intellectual's place was within the
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power struc ture, guiding the political leadership in the governance o f soc iety. Unlike Plato, however, who felt there were definabl e limits under which such a ro le should be assumed, Dewey expressed no limits, and no alterna· tives.
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Now all of this is sheer error: Dewey flatl y refu sed to make th e functional arguments supplant his principles. Dewey's distinctions betw een social democracy (ethical and moral principles) and political democracy (forms of governing) Is spelled out most thoroughly in The Problems of Man, particularly in the last three chapters; but, cu" iously, this Is a volume to which Feinberg has no reference in Reason and Rhetoric, although he did make use of it in an earlier article which is partially incorporated In the book.' 0 If one looks more closely at Felnberg's account of Dewey, he finds some other curious things which deserve mention. For instance, in two quotations from Dewey, Feinberg supplies italics without Indicating that he has done so. In the first c ase, I j udge that the effect is to make Dewey seem precisely to support fu nctional arrange· ments rather than democratic principles. On the latter of these two occasions Feinberg even repeats, apparently for emphasis, just the passage to which he has added the italics-emphasis, again not noting the italics are his, not Dewey's. I quote both passages.
The Deweys' descriptive citation of the Gary School in Schools of Tomorrow provides some idea of the techniques that were avai lable for this purpose. clearly issues of academic freedom will never arise if prejudice or passion are not inflamed. but its effect is to place the burden of proof on the academic style of the intellec tual di ssenter even to the point of hold ing him responsible for the reactions of those " who thoroughly disagree with him." Presumab ly a passionate reac tion was to be taken as evidence of some kind of deficiency in the presentation . After all. Dewey reminded his readers, the scholar "needs tact as well as scholarship."" Further, regarding this last passage, Feinberg does not note that Dew ey goes on to qualify the importance and nature of " tact," Dewey saying that " ... ' tact' suggests perhaps too much a kind of Juggling diplomacy with the questions at issue." 2 l
There is another passage I think one must note, allhough there are others still." This one seems to "presume" on Dewey's intentions, however contrary to his democratic principles. In the c ontext o f a discussion of Dewey's account ot evaluation and his ethical theory, Feinberg says, Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyo ne would agree that ethical behavior and evo· lutionary progress are the same thing or that the latter should serve as the criterion for the former. Some would even fine peculiar the suggestion that our most cherished acts o f altruism, such as caring for the old are bes t j udged as preparations for war or other survival activity. If Dewey were putting lorth on ly a faC· tual claim, then all that could really be said is that at certain times in human his tory, there may be fortunate coincidences between eth · ical acts and evolutionary processes. But o f course this watered down claim did not really suit his purposes and it was useful for him to leave the ambiguous quality alone. On the other hand, to suggest outright that evolu· tionary survival was to be the criterion for ethl· cal activity would have been to provide some clear guidance as to how an ethical claim might be objectively judged. Yet precisely because such a criterion can be challenged on o ther grounds, it was again best for Dew ey to allow the ambiguity to stand . However, Dewey's claim does require some analysis." The passage. s in Dewey that are in question do not in· dicate to me that Dew ey thought his best purposes would be served by ambiguity; indeed, this claim about what Dewey found " useful" and "best" seems merely to " poison the wells" and prejudge the very analysis which, it is claimed, is needed.
Three Ploys Illustrated
Now I think that Feinberg 's analysis does illustrate the three ploys. There is the attack upon Dewey's theory of democracy, which does not work because of a faulty statement of that theory. There is the attempt to d iscredit the practice of Dewey as not genuinely liberal or Clem· ocratic in a number of instances, a discrediting which does not seem convincing in the particular cases dealt with here. Finally, there might be the suggestion that Dew· ey's theory is so confused or ambiguous that It could sup· 5 port about any twist and turn which Dewey wished to make. But, I find this unconvincing.
wtiatever the case, any ploy of revisionism in Dew· ey's theoretical thought has to start with a clear rec· ognition of what he fashioned in his mature social and political thought on democracy. One can refer to Platonic and Hegelian influences on the early and m iddle·years of Dewey, but the "bottom line," as youth today are wont to say, for Dewey resides in the mature, The Public and Its Problems. Earlier I commented on the fact that one form of democracy seems to be implicit in his social con· ception of democracy. I deem It appropriate to quote him on that form, participatory democracy, as the bottom line of th is paper. Any charac terizat ion of him as a centralist, elitist advocate of corporate democracy will be most convincing if it can deal with these words in their context:
The ballot box and majority rule are external and very largely mechanical symbols and ex· pressions. They are expedients, the best devices that at a certain time have been found, but beneath them there are the two ideas: Ii rst, the opportunity, the right and the duty of every individual to form some conviction and ex· press some conviction regarding his own place in the social order, and the relations of that social order to his own welfare; second, the fact that each ind ividual counts as one and one only on an equality with others, so that the final social will comes about as the cooperative ex· pression of the ideas of many people. And I think it is perhaps only recently that we are real izing that (this) ... idea is the essence of all sound education." , Ibid ., p. 101. ' Ibid .
•John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1927), p. 82. Italics are Dewey's.
'Ibid .. • pp. 3(}34, 84·109. 'Ibid., pp. 207·208.
1 One can see why Oe\vey might be a bane of political philosophers. They are apt to criticize him for having no developed theory of pov1er or domination and. hence, no genuine political philosophy. The point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of social democracy to which, given its nature, political philosophy is secondary and, in a very real sense, from which it is derivative. One suspects that they c r iticize him for not having something as basic (power.domination, etc .) which, in the nature of the case, he wants to argue is not basic. Probably A.H. Somjee's The Political Philosophy of John Dewey {New York: Teachers College Press, 1968) is the most understanding of Dewey's basic position from the pe,spective of a political sclentistfphilosopher. Even Somjee seems to lament the lack of a completed or fully developed political philosophy on Dewey's part, how·ever, as tho1:1gh this were Dewey's object. (Ibid., pp. 138·140, 175-178.) His Chapter 4, "Dewey's Mature Political Philosophy," Is highly recommended as background to this article. A lso recqmmended is Wayne A .R.
Leys', "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," in Jo Ann Boydston (Ed.), Guide to Feinberg has correctly pointed out to some of his critics that he never den ied Dewey's concern for community. "In one paragraph I wrote about Oev1ey's concern to have people be abfe 'to recognize themselves as members of a community, each striving to enrich the l ives of all.' And I menlion that Dewey also believed that if 'the community \Vas to be a democratic one ... its members \vere not to be manipulated from above:'' Fein· berg, "On Reading Dewey," p . 401. His reference is to p. 495 of his "Progressive Education and Social Planning," Teachers College Record, 73, 4 (May, 1972) , pp. 486-605. He also notes Dewey's concern i n Reason and Rhetoric. Bot what kind of a concern can he be saying it is that Oev1ey has, if he is convinced that De\vey e><.· pressed no limits and no alternatives to t he intellectuals' role in the power structure? One can take these tv10 contenUonsJ to paraphrase John Wisdom. to mean that v1hen Oev1ey said he really believed in democracy and community, he meant that he did not believe in democracy and community really. For De,vey·s equating of democracy and community, see the last quotation in Part II, herein.
to He does not there make the very strong charge, above, about the role of experts, but he does say: " In the last analysis his [Dewey's) concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the need for experts in a highly complex tec hnological society, and his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a citizenry that is able to see the v1isdom of intelligence expertly exercised." Or, again:
One factor that separated Progressive educators from others was an expressed concern for the well· being and integrity of Immigrant and racial minori· ties. At its best this concern mirrored the appeal fof diversity that v1as an expliclt part of Dewey's notion of community. At its worst it expressed the belief in experts, in authority, and in unity that wa.s hidden in that same notion of community. Nowhere else in the \VOrld is employment of it (pro· paganda) as a tool of control so constant, consis· tent, and systematic as in Russia at present. In· deed, It has taken on such importance and social dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in another social medium. the c orrect meaning. For we instinctively associate propaganda with the ac· complishing of some specific ends, more or less private to a particular class or group and correspond· ingly concealed from others. But i n Russia the propaganda is In behalf of a burni ng public faith. One may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in the object of thei r faith, but their sincerity is beyond question. To them the end for ·which propaganda is employed is not a private or even a c lass gain, but is the universal good of universal humanity. In con· sequence propaganda is education and education Is propaganda. They are more than confounded; t hey are Identical. Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 207·208. Feinberg t hen says George S. Counts " expressed a similar sentiment a few years later.'' and quotes Counts to the effect that, if progressive education is to "emancipate itself," it must " become less frightened t han it is today at the bogeys o f imposition and in· doctrlnallon." Feinberg then remarks that " The appeal that the early phases of the Soviet experi ment held for these educators
Winter. 1980 was as much an indication of their essentially managerial philosophy as it was an expression of their ideas on social justice." Ibid ., p. 208.
I am i ndebted to Paul C. Violas for pointi ng out that Feinberg errs in quoting Dewey to the effect that "They (education and propaganda) are more than confounded; they are identical." De\vey uses the term " identified," not "identical," \Vhlch would make for a weaker case. De\vey easily could hold that the Russians could incorrectly make an identificatio n even i f the tv10 are not identical. John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia (Ne\v York: The Nevi Republic, Inc., 1929}, p. 54. This and another passage in Dewey's work (Ibid., pp. 81-82.) deserve more extended treatment than I can give them here. Soviet education at the community level did appeal to Dewey for a period of time. although even initially he d istrusted Soviet ideology and was not certain aboufv1hat might happen when the ideology came more directly to bear on communal practices. Ibid., pp. 57·58, 113·114, 120·123, 127. The appeal is one thing; but, agai n, it i s quite another to const,ue the quoted passage as saying that Dewey \vanted or though t desirable an identi fication of education and propaganda. It hardly v1ould be consistent \vi th his other statements on education to say that its identi fication with propaganda, " had appeal." See, for example, John Dewey, Character and Events, ed. bY Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), Vol. 11, pp. 517·521, 587·591, 776-781; and his The Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 37. 38, 56, 82. Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use the same quotation {with the same errof) in another work, introducing the quotation with: "Oev1ey's essentially laudatory description o f Soviet education is perhaps Indicative o f his more general attitude about s ocial control." At least equally, " Perhaps not," I think we can reply. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., Work, Tech· nology, and Education, p. 74.
O ne other point must suffice for this brief paper. Feinberg w rites:
One of the schools that Oev1ey reported on in the lat· ter part of the book (Schools of Tomorrow) was P.S. 26 in Indianapolis. P.S. 26 was an all·black school i n a poor black s lum. In vie\v of the condition of the families in the neighborhood and the poverty that Dewey described. the school \Vas carryi ng on some v1orthwhile programs and \vaS rightly included. Oev1ey mentioned that the sc hool was located i n ·' the crov1ded distric t o f the c ity and has only colored pupils /' and he observed t hat the school was not at· tempting to solve the race problem but that i t v1as developi ng good citiiens. If the experiment were to succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in solving the race problem." Yet the program that Dewey then described v1as strictly a vocational program, albeit an excellent one v1here much of the school and the neighborhood served as a s hop for the students. At a time \'/hen much black labor was un· skilled or employe-d as farmhands, a program of skill development v1as an advance torv1ard. Nevertheless. black boys learned how to cook and black girls how to sew.
It mighl be said in the context of the purpose of the Deweys' book that it is unfair to cr iticize Oe\vey for merely reporting on \Vhat ~·as a splendid vocational program wi thout commenting on the social con· ditions that made being a cook one of the highest aspirations of a Negro child. Yet in vie~· of the some\vhat m ild, but nevertheless serious, criticism [that the Oe\veys made elsewhere in School and Society) of Montessori, It v1ould not have been too much to expect a comment on t he implications of a strictly vocational program for black children. A more serious shadov1 Is cast over Dewey's evaluation of the exper iment as he suggests Its greatest value to lie among the youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents. If it was real ism that guided Oev1ey's at·
